In an environment with correlated returns, this paper characterizes optimal lending contracts when the bank faces adverse selection and borrowers have limited liability. Group lending contracts are shown to be dominated by revelation mechanisms which do not use the ex post observability of the partners' performances. However, when collusion between borrowers under complete information is allowed, group lending contracts are optimal in the class of simple revelation mechanisms which elicit only the borrower's own private information and remain useful with extended revelation mechanisms. JEL Classi cation: D8, G2, O12, O17.
Introduction
The development of group lending through the Grameen Bank and similar institutions has attracted the interest of all those who believe that lending to the poor is a necessary step to exit the vicious circles of underdevelopment. The empirical evaluation of the success of these new ways of lending to entrepreneurs who have no collateral is still subject to debates see Khandker, Khalily and Khan 1995 , Morduch 1997 , Pitt and Khandker 1996 Theorists have proposed various explanations for the new opportunities provided by group lending see Ghatak and Guinnane 1998 for a review. In this paper we restrict our attention to group lending as an instrument to improve discrimination between entrepreneurs of di erent t ypes adverse selection.
Ghatak 2000 and Armendariz and Gollier 2000 have argued that group lending triggers a peer selection e ect among entrepreneurs who know each other. For independent types, they show h o w the knowledge of the types in the group which v ary with the di erent regroupings for example in a group of two: two good types or two bad types or one good and one bad type makes discrimination possible. When entrepreneurs do not know each other, with independent t ypes, group lending brings no improvement La ont and N 'Guessan 1999. In this paper we propose a simple model to study the role of group lending in discrimination when collusion between borrowers is possible.
We consider exogenously xed potential pairs of entrepreneurs who carry projects with correlated returns. Each e n trepreneur, when he discovers his type, revises his beliefs about the type of his partner. Nevertheless he does not observe his partner's type. When correlation becomes perfect we h a ve the situation where agents know each other.
We leave aside the issue of endogenous regrouping to focus on two questions: rst, what is the relative p o wer of group lending of the Grameen Bank type called GB contracts, where a successful entrepreneur must contribute to the repayment of his partner if the project of this latter fails, in the class of all possible lending mechanisms? Second, what are the optimal collusion-proof lending contracts and how do the GB contracts perform from the point of view of collusion?
The model with correlated types is presented in Section 2. Optimal individual lending contracts are characterized in Section 3. The optimal pairing mechanisms which are individually incentive compatible are obtained in Section 4. The place of Grameen Bank GB contracts in the class of individually incentive compatible mechanisms is explained in Section 5. Section 6 shows that the GB contracts are in fact optimal when a certain type of group incentive constraints are taken into account. Section 7 considers more general revelation mechanisms and shows that GB contracts remain useful in this context. Section 8 concludes.
The Model
There is a continuum of pairs of entrepreneurs, each e n trepreneur being associated with a good or a bad project. A good resp. bad project returns h when it is successful, i.e., with probability p resp. p with p p , for one unit of investment. For simplicity w e consider only projects of size one.
A pair of entrepreneurs represents a local set of investment opportunities. For simplicity again, we take the case of a group of two e n trepreneurs, but, at the cost of more complex notation, it could be a group of any size. However, the size of the group is here exogenous, and we do not raise the issue of the optimal number of entrepreneurs in a group. Entrepreneurs are risk neutral 3 and have n o w ealth. They must borrow t o i n vest and they can only reimburse their loan if their project is successful.
The lender is a monopolistic bank which has a cost of funds r and which maximizes expected pro t. We assume that under complete information all loans are socially valuable because the expected pro t from a bad type project is greater than the entrepreneur's opportunity cost ph , r , u 0, when u is the status quo utility level of an entrepreneur outside the relationship with the bank. E ciency calls for all projects to be nanced.
Individual Contracts
The bank designs individual contracts. An entrepreneur randomly chosen has a probability = 11 + 12 resp. = 21 + 22 of being of type p resp. p. From the revelation principle we know that, in order to characterize optimal individual contracts, there is no restriction in considering pairs of contracts P ; x ; P ;
x which specify for each t ype a probability of receiving a loan and a payment if the project is successful. These contracts must satisfy incentive constraints which write: 4 P ph , x P p h , that must be given up in Regime 1 to type p in contrast to Regime 2 where no rent need to be given to these entrepreneurs, because of the presence of type p.
In Regime 1 the allocation of loans is e cient, and the good type entrepreneurs are able to obtain a rent despite the monopolistic structure of banking. In Regime 2 the allocation of loans is ine cient since the valuable projects of type p are not nanced, but the good type entrepreneurs obtain no rent.
Pairing Contracts
The bank considers now the natural groups of entrepreneurs which are the pairs of entrepreneurs with correlated projects and exploits the fact that the structure of correlation is common knowledge. For notational convenience let us refer to type p resp. p a s t ype 1 resp. 2. From the revelation principle again, there is no loss of generality in restricting the o er of contracts to two four-uples, x 11 ; x 12 ; x 21 ; x 22 , y 11 ; y 12 ; y 21 ; y 22 , where x ij is the repayment o f a n e n trepreneur who has announced that he is of type i when his partner has announced that he is of type j, and when both have succeeded; similarly y ij is the repayment of a successful entrepreneur when his partner has not succeeded, and with the same announcements. We rst show that, if the correlation of types is high enough, the optimal pairing contracts are e cient and leave no rent t o e n trepreneurs.
Proposition 2 When the correlation is high enough p 12 small enough the optimal contracts of the bank are e cient.
Proof: See Appendix 3.
The logic here is the one of Cr mer-McLean 1988. Using the correlation of types, the bank can design rewards and penalties which both induce truthful revelation of types by e n trepreneurs and saturate participation constraints. Here, we nd X 11 = X 21 X 21 = X 22 , i.e., the payment o f a n e n trepreneur is independent of his own type and greater when he is paired with a good type. We do not need to condition contracts on the production level of the partner, but only on announcements and on the agent's production level because of limited wealth. We will call these contracts unconditional revelation contracts. Di culties may arise from wealth constraints, but this does not occur for a correlation of types high enough.
To explore the e ects of binding wealth constraints we consider a special case of correlation which can be characterized by a single number: Then, the good type obtain a rent
The bank prefers to o er only a contract to the good type with no rent i f ph , r , u R:
Since " 1=4, then Comparing with the case of individual contracts, we see that lending to both types i.e., e cient lending occurs more often now.
When the correlation is high, it is possible by using two p a yments one when the partner announces he is good, one when he announces he his bad to discriminate between types and extract all the information rents. This is achieved despite the pooling nature of the optimal contract.
When the correlation of types is small, the bank asks the successful entrepreneur to pay his whole gain h when his partner is bad and must give up a rent to the good type because it is not possible to exploit su ciently the correlation of types. It shows one limit of yardstick competition 6 especially in developing countries where limited liability constraints are particularly severe.
Grameen Bank Contracts
Group lending has been institutionalized by the Grameen Bank in a particular way. The purpose of this section is to put in perspective these contracts with respect to the optimal contracts characterized in Section 4.
A G.B. contract is characterized, for any e n trepreneur, by t wo possible payments when he is successful: X if his partner is also successful and Y if his partner is not successful. A striking feature is that contrary to the practice of Grameen Banks the payments required from a successful entrepreneur are higher when his partner is successful than when he fails.
8 This is because we h a ve assumed a positive correlation of types. Payments must di er to use the correlation for rent extraction. The positive correlation implies that it is better to extract more in more likely events. To rationalize in our context with adverse selection the practice of Grameen Bank's contracts for which an additional payment i s required when a partner fails we need to assume negative correlation of types. 9 One could of course o er a menu of Grameen Bank's contracts as in Section 4 to induce entrepreneurs to self-select themselves. However, we s a w that it is then useless to vary payments with the success or failure of the partner. It is enough to have them vary with the announcement o f t ype.
Next, we take i n to account the possibility of collusive behavior.
Collusion under Complete Information
Let us rst assume that entrepreneurs may collude when they play the revelation mechanism o ered by the bank but after having accepted the o er of the bank. Accordingly, the participation constraints remain the interim individual participation constraints. Furthermore, we assume that entrepreneurs always share their private information after having 7 Of course, loans to only good types occur in similar circumstances as in Section 2. 8 Note that this feature creates an incentive for an entrepreneur to make his partner's project unsuccessful.
9 From a technical point of view Grameen Bank contracts use an additional ex post signal correlated with the type of the agent, namely the success or failure of the partner. As in Riordan and Sappington 1988 only limited liability prevents the principal to extract all the agent's surplus. accepted the bank's contract, and that a ringmaster organizes the collusion. More precisely we h a ve the following timing: 10 If we proceed as in Section 4 and do not distinguish payments according to the success or failure of the partner, i.e., X ij = x ij = y ij for all i; j, incentive constraints imply X 11 = X 21 = X 22 = X 12 :
We are then back immediately to the individual contracts of Section 2.
Suppose on the contrary that we k eep the exibility o f x ij 6 = y ij . 33 with the wealth constraints:
x ij h for all i; j y ij h for all i; j:
With the interim participation constraints and the incentive constraints we h a ve eight constraints and also eight v ariables. Furthermore, we h a ve the wealth constraints. The determinant of this system is p , p which is non null as soon as there is some correlation. We can nd X and Y which solve the system. We obtain for p + p 1:
Proposition 5 The optimal collusion-proof contract is the optimal Grameen Bank contract if correlation is high enough.
11
Note that the optimal collusion-proof contract is not here what would result from the optimal contract of Section 4 with collusion. Indeed, then they would always claim that they are both bad types since from Appendix 3 we notice that X 12 = X 22 X 11 = X 21 . They would always pay X 11 and therefore the pair of good types would have a rent contrary to what is achieved in the Grameen bank contract for a high correlation.
Grameen Bank contracts have been presented in the literature Ghatak 2000, Armendariz and Gollier 2000 as useful to allow some discrimination between types. We have shown that their value for discrimination is limited and that, for this purpose, they are dominated by contracts which v ary payments as a function of the agent's announcements. However, these latter contracts are not collusion-proof if agents can collude when they play the announcement game. On the contrary, the GB contracts are robust to this type of collusion while still allowing some discrimination. This is achieved by exploiting the correlation of types in the uncertainty on nal production.
Extended Mechanisms
We assume now that the mechanism asks from agents the whole vector of types once they have shared their information. Any deviation from the sending of the same messages by the two agents is punished. We are left with the collusion-proof constraints as incentive constraints.
Suppose one does not distinguish payments according to the success or failure of the partner. We call these mechanisms unconditional extended revelation mechanisms. These constraints reduce to Proposition 6 Unconditional extended r evelation mechanisms cannot be c ollusion-proof and e cient.
See Appendix 4 for the proof. The intuition of this result is that, for a coalition, we have three types pp; p p; p p and three revelant incentive constraints at least, and also a participation constraint for each agent, hence ve constraints, and only four degrees of freedom.
The added exibility of unconditional extended revelation mechanisms is not enough to achieve e ciency, while simple Gramen Bank contract do achieve e ciency when the correlation is high enough. Proposition 4 remains valid with collusion when extended mechanisms are used. Using Grameen Bank extended mechanisms will increase the range of parameters for which e ciency is achieved. We can safely conclude that Grameen Bank contracts remain useful to deal with collusion in this extended framework.
We h a ve assumed so far that agents share information with or without collusion. The bank knows that agents will discover the characteristics of both agents and can use extended mechanisms. If instead, the third party only has the technology for sharing information, in a mechanism which does not elicit the fact that agents collude, the bank cannot use extended mechanisms and we m ust combine the complete information collusion-proof constraints of Section 6 with individual Bayesian incentive constraints. However, the bank could also force communication with the third party b y asking both pieces of information and use collusion-proof extended mechanisms. Then we are back to this section. With a benevolent third party the two modellings lead to the same results.
Another interesting situation occurs when the sharing of information occurs only with some probability. Then one can argue that extended mechanisms cannot be used if the principal wants to be sure to satisfy the individual rationality constraints. But then the collusion-proof constraints must be written under incomplete information, 12 leaving open the relevance of collusion under complete information with some probability. H o wever, Grameen Bank will remain in general useful when collusion is an issue despite the fact that unconditional revelation contracts perform better because of the transaction costs of collusion due to asymmetric information.
Conclusion
We h a ve considered an extremely simple model to make t wo points. On the one hand, GB contracts are a particular way of practicing a subtle type of discrimination and constitute a p o werful tool of rent extraction when types are correlated. However, they are not the optimal such instruments and furthermore they require negative correlation of types to rationalize payments higher when the partner fails. On the other hand, we h a ve shown that GB contracts are interesting to extract rents when collusive behavior is possible.
These results should be robust to more general situations with loans of variable sizes, endogenous grouping. It is obvious for the rst result. It relies on the di culties of enforcing collusion ex post for the second.
We leave for further research a more detailed analysis of the optimal collusion-proof contracts when collusion takes places under asymmetric information with limited liability constraints taking into account in particular in the design of side-contracts.
A necessary next step for the analysis will be to consider dynamic situations. With full commitment of the bank, the emphasis should be on the opportunities of dynamic collusion. Without full commitment, we will have to deal with the additional problems of ratchet e ects.
